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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS. ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
   
ABSTRACT 
Purpose This paper presents empirical evidence about relationships between the 
corporate governance mechanisms of the Spanish savings banks, their financial and 
social performance and their profitability prior to their collapse. 
Design We use a structural equation model (SEM), taking the return on assets as the 
dependent variable, and corporate governance, corporate social responsibility and 
efficiency as explanatory constructs. SEM methodology provides interesting features 
which allows a better definition of some organisational characteristics. 
Findings Results indicate that corporate governance characteristics, including the 
politicisation of governance bodies, did not affect financial performance. The size of the 
board of directors had a significant influence on social responsibility. In addition, 
results suggest that the whole board focused on social issues, whereas non-executive 
members were less concerned about economic issues. Greater money allocation to 
social welfare programmes resulted in higher profitability, which can be explained by 
competitive advantages, reputation and customer satisfaction. 
Social implications Nowadays, some political parties demand either for the creation of 
a public banking sector or banks with social goals. This paper provides interesting 
insights to the debate. 
Originality/value The influence of personal attributes of board members on 
performance need to be analysed in greater depth in the non-profit sector. The SEM 
methodology allows us to include some board attributes and performance dimensions in 
a better way than with other methodologies. 
Keywords: non-profit banks, corporate governance, structural equation model, Spain 
Article Classification: Research paper  
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SPANISH SAVINGS BANKS. ITS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Introduction 
During the financial crisis at the end of the 2000s, the Spanish banking system 
almost collapsed and most of the Spanish banks needed economic help to overcome the 
crisis. Commercial banks were able to find financial support from their shareholders by 
increasing capital. However, most of the Spanish savings banks (SBs) which, prior to 
the crisis, made up approximately 50% of the Spanish banking system, had to be 
rescued by the Government. SBs were private foundations that had two main objectives: 
financial and social. As these entities did not operate under capital market discipline, 
they showed shortages in competitiveness and efficiency (Crespı́ et al., 2004).  
Most research on the effect of corporate governance (CG) does not take into 
account how the governance mechanisms and social responsibility practices affect firm 
performance (Fernández-Gago et al., 2016). Considering that SBs had two 
organisational goals namely financial and social, the study the influence of CG on 
performance in these entities is biased and incomplete if these two dimensions are not 
included in the study as dependent and interrelated variables. Furthermore, tensions 
between philanthropic and business oriented goals can arise in entities, like SBs, with 
social and economic objectives. 
The academic literature has studied formal, rather than qualitative, measures of 
boardroom composition (e.g. board size, independence, ownership) and their effect on 
banking performance, but few papers have analysed the influence of political presence 
on these boards (García-Meca and García-García, 2015). The political presence in the 
governance of Spanish SBs makes the Spanish financial crisis different to those of other 
countries (Fonseca, 2005; Delgado et al., 2007; Pina et al., 2016). Political influence 
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and the absence of owners were considered major problems of SBs and causes of their 
collapse. Thus, in the study of CG mechanisms of the SBs, as well as in any foundation, 
or non-government entity, with a strong political influence, the study of the effects of 
political presence on boards is needed. 
Previous empirical research has mainly analysed Spanish SBs only from economic 
or financial points of view: productivity (Buch et al., 2011; Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 
1996; Illueca et al., 2009; La Porta et al., 2002; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2004; Tortosa-
Ausina et al., 2008), costs (Carbo et al., 2003; Maudos et al., 2002a; Prior, 2003) or 
efficiency (Cuesta and Orea, 2002; García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008 and Tortosa-
Ausina, 2002; Prior et al., 2016). However, as one of the two goals of these entities is 
the funding of social welfare programmes, an economic approach to their performance 
is both limited and biased. Thus, an approach that considers the achievement of social 
welfare goals is needed.  
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it studies the effect of political 
presence on the boards on organisational performance. This qualitative characteristic of 
the board is considered a key factor in the failure of the SBs. Second, it analyses their 
performance multidimensionally because these entities had both financial and social 
goals. The paper analyses the performance of the SBs from two dimensions: the 
financial and the social performance. The relationship between corporate governance 
and financial and social performance has been hardly studied with these two 
performance dimensions as interrelated and dependent variables. This is the gap that we 
are trying to fill with our paper. In a period when some political parties demand either 
for the creation of a public banking sector or banks with social goals, new analyses of 
the performance of SBs which, given the political control of their boards can be 
considered similar to government banks, can provide interesting insights to the debate. 
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The article is organised as follows. The next section presents the SBs. Section 3 
develops our hypotheses. Section 4 details or research design, including the 
methodology employed, a structural equation model, data and the variables used in the 
analysis. In Section 5, we present the empirical results. Sections 6 and 7 contain the 
discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. The Spanish Saving Banks context 
SBs were private foundations that had two main objectives: financial and social. 
The term ‘financial objectives’ refers to the traditional business of the banking sector, 
that is, granting credit and capturing deposits. Their social function required that part of 
their profits, the so-called ‘social dividends’, be allocated in their region of origin 
through the delivery of cultural, charitable and social services to the population. The 
social nature of these entities was reflected in their corporate governance structure, 
which was based on two main bodies: the General Assembly and the Board of 
Directors. The General Assembly was the highest governing body, elected the Board of 
Directors and represented the main stakeholders, namely, depositors, regional and local 
governments, founders and employees. The General Assembly was the body which 
approved the amount devoted to social activities. ‘Social objectives’ differentiated SBs 
from other financial institutions. Through ‘social dividends’, SBs returned part of their 
profits to society by funding charitable and cultural activities.  
SBs offered the same financial services as commercial banks. SBs did not have 
shareholders, and were, in fact, managed and controlled by political institutions, mainly 
regional and local governments. During many years, these entities were acclaimed as an 
example of excellent management. Clearly, the financial crisis has shown these entities 
failed in terms of the risks they assumed. The need for public funds to rescue some SBs 
5 
 
during the last financial crisis was a controversial issue, particularly when the 
commercial banks did not get public money. However, from their very origins, SBs 
dedicated millions of euros as profit distribution and social expenditure to fund cultural, 
social, health and other welfare projects. 
Most of the Spanish SBs were created at the end of the 19th Century by civil and 
catholic associations. They were private foundations with financial and social objectives 
(social welfare). With the arrival of democracy in Spain in 1978, the SBs strengthened 
their market position and a national law put them on the same level as private banks. 
Until 1989, the SBs only operated in one region and they were not allowed to operate in 
other territories. Although they were financial entities with commercial goals, local and 
regional governments exerted their control by having voting rights on the General 
Assembly. 
At the end of the 1980s, Spanish SBs underwent a transformation process. 
National legislation extended their sphere of operations from a regional to a national 
level, which allowed them to open branches outside their region. Most SBs expanded 
and diversified their territorial branching network (Illueca et al., 2009). This expansion 
played an important role in the increase of competition in the banking sector and led to 
aggressive marketing policies to obtain more market share. According to Pastor et al. 
(2016), far from generating positive effects through greater competition in the banking 
sector, the diversification of investments and the reduction of risk controls resulted in 
lower productivity and worse resource allocation.  
 
3. Hypotheses  
In this section, we analyse the factors that contribute to explaining the 
performance of savings banks and develop our hypotheses. CSR is a broad concept 
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which encompasses different dimensions, such as social and environmental 
performance. Our measure of social performance focuses on the way organisational 
achievements are given back to society and stakeholders. We focus our analyses on 
social performance although we base our development hypotheses on the literature 
about CSR because of the lack of empirical research about the relationship between 
corporate governance and social performance. 
The governing bodies of the SBs represented the interests of the different 
stakeholders. The stewardship theory proposes that stewards, in our case board 
members, are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals and make 
decisions that are in the best interests of the overall organisation in cases where different 
stakeholders express competing objectives (Davis et al., 1997). For non-profit entities, 
legitimacy can be as important as achieving their goals. Organisational legitimacy 
is achieved when actions are observed to be desirable, or appropriate, within the 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Schuman, 
1995). The legitimacy theory assumes that it is important for an organisation to 
engage in and control the processes of legitimization in order to demonstrate its 
congruence with societal values (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Thus, legitimacy is 
important to ensure continued support from society (Laguir et al, 2015).  
 
3.1. Influence of the General Assembly on performance  
The General Assembly set the priorities that SBs assigned to their different 
objectives. This body acted in a similar way to the shareholders’ annual general meeting 
and selected the board of directors and decided the allocation of profits. Its structure, 
where different stakeholders were represented, conditioned its strategy and main 
decisions. Spanish studies that demonstrate the relevance of this governing body are 
7 
 
those of Delgado et al., (2007), García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2014) and García-
Meca and García-García (2015). This assembly represented different stakeholders, so it 
is logical to assume that its members acted as stewards of the social group they 
represented on the assembly. It is expected that the General Assembly influenced the 
financial and social performance of SBs, depending on the objectives of the groups 
represented, with a greater focus on one dimension of the other depending on the need 
of its member for legitimacy. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: The General Assembly influenced efficiency and social welfare programmes. 
 
3.2 Influence of political presence on the board on performance  
Political presence in the governance of Spanish SBs made the Spanish financial 
crisis different to those of other countries (Crespı́ et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2007; 
Fonseca, 2005). The politicisation of the governing bodies of SBs led to a lower 
performance (García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008) and, when public authorities had a 
higher participation in SBs, the level of risk increased as investments responded to 
political objectives rather than to economic goals (Pina et al., 2016). Furthermore, a 
systematic exchange of favours between politicians and business elites arose (García-
Meca, 2015). The study of García-Meca and García-García (2015) shows that higher 
political influence on boards resulted in lower efficiency.  
Besides politicisation, there were concerns about the inexperience and lack of 
qualifications of the members of the governing bodies of SBs. Political presence 
allowed managers without economic or financial education to participate in the running 
of SBs (Pina et al., 2016). In the banking industry, professionalism is even more 
important than in other companies due to the complex aspects of the business. The 
Spanish reform of the SBs law sought the professionalisation of their governing bodies. 
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According to Cuñat and Garicano (2010), a SB run by someone with post-graduate 
education, with previous banking experience and with no previous political 
appointments was likely to have significantly less real estate lending as a share of total 
lending and a lower rate of non-performing loans. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2014) conclude that SBs run by a chairman with previous banking experience were 
likely to be significantly more solvent. In sum, board members with financial expertise 
improve the corporate governance by enhancing the decision-making process. 
Therefore, the presence of more politicians is likely to reduce the influence of 
professional managers on decisions about financial issues. Menozzi et al. (2012) for 
Stated-Owned enterprises find that more politised boards exert a positive effect on 
social performance, measured in increasing the number of employees and favouring 
contracting staff, but a negative effect on the financial performance. In line with the 
stewardship theory, boards are more likely to have a greater focus on social goals than 
on financial goals because the former were more important for a majority of the 
stakeholders. In terms of the stewardship and legitimacy theories, politicians on 
boards will most likely be focused on the social dimension of performance than on 
the economic one to better serve the interest of main stakeholders and to gain 
legitimacy in the opinion of the citizenry that they represent. 
Therefore, we test the following hypotheses: 
H2a: A more politicised board is negatively related to efficiency in the Spanish 
savings banks sector. 
H2b: A more politicised board is positively related to social welfare programmes 





3.3 Influence of board size on performance  
Another board characteristic included in corporate governance studies is size 
(see e.g. Bozec and Dia, 2007; Bennedsen et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Coles et 
al., 2008; Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Adams and Mehran, 2012). There are two main 
views in the literature regarding the influence of board size on firm performance (see 
e.g. Guest, 2009). On the one hand, larger boards positively affect firm performance 
because they possess greater collective information and are more likely to have more 
independent directors who can provide better monitoring. For the banking industry, the 
results of Adams and Mehran (2012) support this view. On the other hand, larger boards 
may have problems of coordination and communication; reaching consensus may be 
more difficult. The possibility of the presence of free-riding directors is also higher 
because the cost to any individual director of not exercising diligence falls in proportion 
to board size. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) find that the addition of new directors is 
positively related to performance, but there is a point after which adding new directors 
reduces bank value. A significant part of the empirical literature agrees that, after 
reaching a certain size, adding new directors to the board negatively influences financial 
performance and/or the value of the firm (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998, 
De Andres et al., 2005). Bennedsen et al. (2008) explain their results arguing that the 
‘right’ number of directors is a trade-off between the benefits of having sufficient 
competencies represented and the cost of having free-riders among the directors. 
Nonetheless, the results of Coles et al. (2008) support a third view which states that 
very small or very large boards are optimal in terms of firm value.  
Regarding the influence of board size on social performance, and, in particular, 
firm allocation to philanthropic practices, Brown et al. (2006) suggest that larger boards 
tend to become symbolic and a source of social interaction for the directors, and lose 
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contact with the managerial process. The results of Brown et al. (2006) show that firms 
with larger boards give significantly more cash to charity. These factors may lead to a 
lower financial performance orientation and a greater social orientation of the board. 
These authors give two main reasons for a positive relationship between board size and 
donations. First, larger boards are more likely to have a less effective monitoring, 
leading to larger philanthropic contributions. Second, the larger the board, the more 
directors are likely to pursue for their own social interests, also leading to larger money 
contributions. Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) find a positive association between 
board size and CSR practices although, when this association surpasses a threshold, 
CSR practices are reduced. Bai (2013), for board attributes in non-profit organisations 
(US hospitals), find that whereas board size is negatively associated to social 
performance in for-profit hospitals, it is positively associated to social performance in 
non-profit hospitals. Menozzi et al. (2012) find that board size has a positive effect on 
social performance but a negative one on financial performance.  
In terms of the stewardship and legitimacy theories, larger boards will most 
likely have a more diverse presence of stakeholders for whom the social dimension 
of performance is more important than the economic one. To better represent the 
interests of stakeholders, and to gain legitimacy, larger boards will be more 
socially than economically oriented. Therefore, we test the following hypotheses: 
H3a: A larger board is negatively related to efficiency in the Spanish savings 
banks sector. 
H3b: A larger board is positively related to social welfare programmes in the 





3.4 The efficiency factor in the savings bank sector 
The process of financial integration and the structural change in the Spanish 
banking sector during the 1990s sought to promote competition (Cuesta and Orea, 2002) 
with the purpose of improving the efficiency of the sector. This competition was the 
result of a liberalised regulatory framework, the emergence of new financial 
intermediaries, the process of disintermediation and the diffusion of new technologies. 
Salas and Saurina (2003) assert that, in a more concentrated market, consolidated banks 
will adopt less risky policies. An increase in banking competition generates more 
efficiency (Reboredo, 2004) and enhances the performance of the entities in this sector 
(Maudos et al., 2002b; Prior, 2003), mainly because cost reductions arising from 
technical efficiency have a positive influence on profits. An efficient company that 
reduces costs has more ability to meet its long-term costs and to accomplish long-term 
expansion and growth.  
SBs were non-profit organisations but, as commercial financial entities, they 
competed with the other banks in the financial market and had to obtain profits to 
maintain their market share. The ‘corporatisation’ of these entities meant changes in 
their governance to imitate commercial banks’ management and to be more efficient. 
Entities that carry out a restructuring strategy that includes the reduction of operating 
expenses such as salaries, central services expenses and number of branches will be 
more efficient. When an entity decreases staff costs and makes labour force adjustments 
obtains a higher efficiency and all these initiatives lead to more profitability. 
However, entities may be profitable without being efficient. SBs granted a great 
quantity of credits and obtained large profits, but large profits are not necessarily the 
result of acting efficiently. Furthermore, despite the high competition, SBs had a 
significant market share in their region of origin, which allowed them to apply higher 
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fees, which might compensate for these inefficiencies. As these entities did not operate 
under capital market discipline, the relationship between efficiency and profitability is 
not clear. Politicians sought a greater implication of savings banks in regional 
development (García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008) and the financing of projects 
according to political criteria rather than to profitability. The political presence on the 
governing bodies interferes in the relationship between efficiency and profitability. So, 
our fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: Efficiency is related to the financial performance of the Spanish savings 
banks. 
 
3.5 The social welfare programmes in the savings bank sector 
The goal of the contribution of the SBs to wealth distribution and welfare was to 
invest in social or community programs and to promote regional development when the 
private sector lacked interest in these investments (García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008). 
Key regional development projects were carried out with financial support from the SBs 
(Maroto and Melle, 1999; Fonseca, 2005). 88% of SBs had collaboration agreements 
with the public sector regarding welfare services, and SBs devoted almost 3,000 million 
euros to social programs in 2009. The expenditure was focused on social welfare and 
healthcare (41%), culture and leisure activities (33%), education and research (17%), 
and historic and natural heritage (9%) (CECA, 2009). However, its contribution to the 
sustainable enlargement of society was questioned because of its lack of economic 
viability (Carbo et al., 2003; San-Jose et al., 2014). The lack of ownership and the 
political influence on savings banks’ boards affected managerial decisions because 
politicians sought to finance projects according to political criteria rather than to 
profitability. Huge investments in public projects, such as airports, high speed train 
13 
 
stations, conference centres and motorways which had not activity, together with risky 
loans, generated the bankruptcy of the savings banks sector and the banking rescue 
process in Spain (Pina et al. 2016). 
Social objectives can have negative effects, such as underperformance and 
inefficient credit allocation because of political influence and agency problems for SBs 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2002; Illueca et al., 
2013). As Illueca et al. (2009) assert, the ‘social dividends’ reflect the non-profit nature 
of SBs, which may often conflict with value maximisation goals. In line with this, 
Fernández-Gago et al. (2016) consider that the managers of a firm with good 
performance might reduce social activities to maximise their own personal income in 
the short term and that, if the financial performance is low, the managers might try to 
justify this poor performance by carrying out attractive social programmes. However, in 
the academic literature, other authors have found that there is no direct relationship 
between CSR and financial performance (Surroca et al., 2004; Garcia-Castro et al, 
2010) or that there is a positive effect of CSR on firm performance, due to its effect on 
competitive advantages, reputation and customer satisfaction (Saeidi et al., 2015). 
Rodgers et al. (2013) find that firms’ broad societal strategies can lead to a material 
improvement in their financial performance and enhance their market value.  
So, our last hypothesis is: 
H5: Resource allocation to social welfare programmes affects the financial 







4. Methodology and research design  
4.1 Methodology and sample 
We use the structural equation modelling (SEM) based on partial least squares 
(PLS) approach (SmartPLS 2.0 software) for our analyses. This technique has been 
widely used in marketing (Roldán and Sánchez-Franco, 2012). SEM is a family of 
statistical techniques that incorporates and integrates path analysis and factor 
analysis. The SEM process consists of two steps: validating the measurement 
model and fitting the structural model. Serrano-Cinca et al. (2007) used this 
methodology to predict bank bankruptcy. Sarstedt et al. (2014) explain different 
characteristics and advantages of the PLS-SEM methodology and use it in a family 
business analysis. Another example of the use of SEM, although with a different 
approach, is the work of Shaukat et al. (2016), studying the relationship between board 
attributes and CSR performance.  
One of the main advantages of the SEM-PLS technique is that it allows us to 
carry out analyses which include financial and social performance in the same model to 
study the effect of corporate governance on these two potentially interrelated 
dimensions. Most of the literature uses OLS-based methodologies in which several 
independent variables explain just one performance dimension (dependent variable). 
SEM allows the study of interactions between variables (or constructs), that is, a 
variable can be both a dependent and an independent variable of other variables. 
Therefore, complex relationships between variables with direct and indirect effects can 
be studied (Serrano-Cinca et al., 2007). Another advantage of this methodology is that it 
can use ‘constructs’ as variables. Constructs are made up of several items or indicators 
to better capture the characteristics and features of the complex ‘reality’ to be studied, 
strengthening the results and their interpretation. While other approaches to SEM (such 
15 
 
as covariance-based methods) have strong sample-size requirements, PLS restrictions 
are generally much smaller. Despite the growing use of the SEM methodology in 
business research, studies applying PLS-SEM in the management and finance areas are 
relatively scarce. One limitation of this methodology is that, because PLS is a 
regression based technique, the number of variables/constructs in the model is 
limited by the size of the sample. The minimum sample size should be, at least, ten 
times the number of arrows pointing to a variable/construct (Hair et al, 2012). 
Another limitation highlighted by these authors is that PLS-SEM is a more 
prediction-oriented approach compared to other SEM methodologies such as 
covariance based (CB) methods, which have a confirmatory approach.  
For our analyses, we develop a SEM-PLS model to test the effect of 
corporate bodies on social responsibility and efficiency, assuming that these two 
firm performance dimensions influence profitability. Most of the academic 
literature focuses on the influence of board characteristics on one outcome 
dimension, namely economic performance or environmental or social 
responsibility. This approach does not take into consideration the interrelation 
between these dimensions. CSR is a multidimensional concept which encompasses 
social, governance, economic and environmental dimensions (Laguir et al 2015). 
The SEM-PLS methodology allows us to include several relationships which 
result in a better decomposition of how the variables/constructs included in the 
model interact. We contribute to the scarce, but growing, literature that studies 
corporate governance considering the multidimensional performance of firms and 
non-profit entities. SEM allows us to test all of the relationships in the model 
simultaneously and PLS is particularly appropriate when the model is complex 
(Fornell and Bookstein, 1982). Garcia-Torea et al (2016) use the SEM methodology 
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to determine whether economic and social responsible approaches are possible 
when boards are properly focused on these two dimensions. Their results show 
that effective boards, that is, boards that fulfil several characteristics such as an 
adequate size, independence or diversity, are able of protecting shareholder value 
and also respond to the interests of the rest of the firm’s stakeholders.  
Shaukat et al (2016) test the link between the CSR attributes of the board, 
its CSR strategy, and its environmental and social performance. They also use a 
SEM approach and find that the greater the CSR orientation of the board, the 
more proactive and comprehensive the firm’s CSR strategy and the higher its 
environmental and social performance. The CSR orientation of the board is 
measured by the board’s independence, its gender diversity, and the financial 
expertise of the audit committee. Park et al (2017) demonstrate that a company's 
CSR commitment induces greater satisfaction with and trust in the company and 
its services, which encourage consumers to remain loyal. Greater loyalty will most 
likely be reflected in the economic results of companies and a better brand image. 
Engagement in CSR and brand management helps to maximize firm value (Wang 
et al, 2015). A greater social orientation increases profitability due to competitive 
advantages, reputation and customer satisfaction (Saeidi et al. 2015). Rodgers et al 
(2013) analyse whether a firm’s investment in CSR pays off economically in the 
long term and find that the customer dimension of CSR has a significant impact on 
financial performance measures.  
We base the use of a SEM-PLS approach on the premise that boards do not 
take economic and CSR decisions independently and that these decisions together 
influence the final financial return of organisations. Moreover, for non-profit 
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entities, CSR and economic decisions must go hand in hand and this combination 
is reflected in their profitability.  
This study is focused on the 45 SBs that were operating in Spain in 2009. After 
2009, the savings banks were involved in merging processes. Most of the 45 savings 
banks have finally merged into 5 big banks. We collected our data from three different 
sources: financial information of SBs was obtained from the CECA (Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks), whereas corporate governance information of SBs 
regarding board and power distribution was taken from the Comisión Nacional del 
Mercado de Valores-Spanish Securities Market Commission. This study analyses 
factors that influence SBs profitability using a structural equation model and taking the 
main governing bodies, efficiency and social welfare as explanatory factors.  
 
4.2 Variable measurement and model 
Our model captures two key features of the governing bodies of SBs, 
namely, size and politicisation. Size is almost always included in academic studies 
as a key feature of boards of directors. Having more members in a corporate body 
increases its diversity of skills and its representativeness. In a democratic society, 
politicians and elected governments represent society. Politicisation also captures 
the dependence of members towards elected governments. In the elusive concept of 
the property of the SBs, Spanish law gave local and regional government a great 
influence in the selection of the members of their governing bodies  
To assess the effect of the General Assembly, two variables have been included: 
the size of the General Assembly and its power distribution. Size is measured as the 
number of members in the General Assembly (GAsize). We determine the distribution 
of power in the General Assembly by calculating the percentage of members who 
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represent local and regional governments over the total number of members (GApolit). 
The General Assembly is the body that, at least nominally, decided the SB strategy and 
set its goals.  
To analyse the board, one variable indicative of size and one construct associated 
the politicisation have been included. The number of members in the board is indicative 
of their size and denoted as BDsize. The politicisation of the board (BDpolit) is 
captured by a construct made up of two items: the percentage of members of the board 
representing a regional or local government over the total number of members (POL) 
and a dummy variable (CEO) representing the political connections or links of the CEO 
to a political party. This variable takes the value ‘0’ when the CEO has no political 
connections and ‘1’ otherwise. The importance of key members in board decisions is 
supported by the Upper Echelon Theory (see Hambrick and Mason, 1984) which states 
that organisational outcomes reflect the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in 
the organisation. For example, Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2015) show the importance 
of personal attributes (gender) of the chairperson and the CEO on the performance of 
non-profit organisations. As stated, the use of a construct for capturing the 
politicisation of the board allows us to include in a better way this personal 
attribute of the members of the board, which has been less frequently studied than 
other attributes. This way, we can better measure its influence on the performance 
dimensions included in our study.  
SBs are non-profit organisations and, because of this, they are under less pressure 
to obtain profits than commercial banks. So, the traditional assessment methods 
(profitability indicators) are not enough to analyse these entities. Therefore, to study SB 
performance we assess their efficiency and their social responsibility.  
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There are two main alternatives to measure banking activity, namely, the 
production approach and the intermediation approach. The first considers banking 
institutions as producers of services for their clients. The intermediation approach 
expands the definition of inputs to include deposits. It considers banking institutions 
primarily as intermediating entities between savers and investors. Prior studies have 
measured performance by focusing on one of these two alternatives, particularly the 
intermediation approach (Illueca et al., 2009) but, there is, as far as we know, no 
research that considers both approaches. In this study, we adopt this dual perspective. 
To measure SBs efficiency, we use a construct made up of two scores: DEA1, with an 
intermediation approach and DEA2, with a production approach, obtained by applying 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker 
(1984).  
For the intermediation approach (DEA1), the amount of deposits, their cost 
measured as interest and charges paid and the cost of the staff have been included as 
inputs in the model. As outputs, we include loans and interest and fees received. All 
these variables are relevant because they reflect the view that SBs make loans to obtain 
an income (Kumbhakar et al. 2001). The intermediation approach with these inputs and 
outputs has been used by Maudos et al. (2002a), Carbo et al. (2003), Cuesta and Zofío 
(2005), Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008), Illueca et al. (2009) and Williams et al. (2011), 
among others. For the production approach (DEA2), the number of branches and the 
staff have been included as inputs in the model. As outputs, we include the amount of 
deposits and loans.  
Social responsibility is assessed using the construct ‘social responsibility’, which 
is made up of two indicators: euros effectively devoted to social welfare in 2009 (SR1) 
and the part of the profits of 2008 approved by the General Assembly to be allocated to 
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social welfare (SR2). Both variables are introduced into the model in their natural 
logarithms. 
Financial performance is a complex concept, so we include ratios related to a 
single aspect of financial performance: profitability. Previous empirical studies (Lozano 
Vivas, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997; Maudos et al., 2002a; Sapienza, 2002; Illueca et 
al., 2013; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013; García-Meca and García-García, 2015; among others) 
have included Return on Assets (ROA) and/or Return on Equity (ROE) to study bank 
profitability. The return on assets (ROA) is perhaps the single most important ratio for 
comparing the efficiency and operational performance of banks (Trujillo, 2013). Other 
papers that have used this magnitude in this context are Akhavein et al. (1997), 
Sapienza (2002), Vander-Vennet (2006), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Vallascas and 
Hagendorff (2011), Caiazza et al. (2013), Behr and Heid (2011) and Pina et al. (2017). 
In addition, the level of bank capital funds is subject to capital adequacy standards 
(Vander Vennet, 1996) and SBs were foundations, that is, they did not have equity 
instruments so they did not have shares and, hence, shareholders and owners. We create 
the construct “financial performance” with two financial ratios associated with ROA: 
Profit before Tax/Assets (ROA1), and Net Profit/Assets (ROA2). 
Control variable 
The size of the entity is a characteristic which is usually included in any analysis 
of the topic and contributes to explaining the variation of the performance of the SBs 
(e.g. Maudos et al., 2002; Carbo et al., 2003; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). The 
literature normally uses one single indicator to capture the size of the entity but, in fact, 
size is a characteristic that can be measured in different ways. Using SEM advantages, 
we capture the size of the SBs using three measures: the total assets (Assets), number of 
employees (Staff), and number of branches (Branches) of each Spanish SB in 2009. 
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These variables are transformed into their logarithmic form in order to minimise 
normality problems and to avoid heteroscedasticity. 
 
Model explanation 
Figure 1 shows the model that analyses the relationships and hypotheses to be 
tested. Circular variables represent “constructs” made up of two items while squares 
represent variables made up of a single item. Our model takes advantage of the SEM-
PLS methodology in the following way. First, key variables are included as 
constructs instead of single-item variables. The politicisation of the board, the 
focus of our study about this corporate body, takes into account both the 
percentage of politicians on the board and whether the CEO, a key influential seat, 
also had political links. The ‘dependent’ variables, efficiency, social responsibility 
and profitability are also constructs. Constructs capture the variables included in a 
model better. Second, corporate bodies do not take decisions about one 
performance dimension without considering the other dimensions. Thus, the 
inclusion of two performance dimensions in the model captures the influence of 
governing bodies on them better. Third, boards take economic and social decisions 
which influence the profitability of the SBs. The inclusion of profitability in the 
model as a ‘truly’ dependent variable closes the relationship between the 
governing bodies, performance dimensions and profitability. Size is included as a 
control variable. As a limitation of the model, due to sample size, only two board 
features have been analysed. In addition, it is worth remembering that CSR is a 
multidimensional concept. Although the environmental dimension is not included 
in our model, SBs do not carry out activities that are especially harmful to the 
environment. Table 1 presents the description and items include in our variables.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
5. Analysis of results 
PLS analysis must be developed in two independent stages: the measurement 
model analysis and the structural model analysis. The measurement model assessment 
involves the examination of the adequacy of the measurement scales. The analysis of 
the structural model focuses on testing the causal paths between the constructs that 
compose the theoretical model. This procedure guarantees the reliability and validity of 
the measurement instruments. The examination of the structural model focuses on 
testing the causal paths between the constructs that compose the theoretical model. 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analyses. 
  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
As shown in Table 2, the percentage of representatives of regional and local 
governments in the General Assembly ranges from 16% to 50%, which shows the 
diversity of the SBs of the sample. This diversity is more pronounced in the Boards, 
with a range of 5% to 74% and a mean of 36%, which shows that political institutions 
had significant participations, in general, in the decision-making process. As for the size 
of governing bodies, the table shows the high diversity in the sample and the freedom of 
SBs to decide the number of members of both bodies. The mean of the members on the 
board is 18, which is higher than that of the boards of the Spanish commercial banks 
studied by De Andres and Vallelado (2008), which was 14. Table 2 shows that almost 
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half of the sample (19 out of 45) has a political connected CEO. The mean of the 
efficiency, measured by DEA1 and DEA2, is 93% and 81%, respectively, which are 
high scores. The profit and expenses devoted to social welfare is high, with SBs 
devoting, on average, 70 million euros to social programmes. However, some SBs 
devoted very little to their social programmes. The two variables indicative of ROA 
have similar descriptive statistics and, although some SBs present negative values, they 
do not reach such extreme values as those reported by De Andres and Vallelado (2008), 
which were -9% and 7%.  
 
5.1 Analysis of the measurement model 
We estimate the measurement model with PLS in order to analyse internal 
consistency. Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the measurement model. This 
process essentially involves three stages (see e.g. Roldán and Sánchez-Franco, 2012). 
First, the reliability of the individual indicators is evaluated using their factor loadings 
(λ). This permits an evaluation of whether or not each indicator that forms the construct 
is highly correlated with its respective latent variable. Variables made up of just one 
item have a factor loading of 1. The results show that all the values, except one, exceed 
the threshold of 0.7 required by Carmines and Zeller (1979). The only value that does 
not reach this value is CEO, included in the BDpolit construct. Nonetheless, the value is 
0.69, so it can be accepted as valid.  
Second, reliability is explored analysing Cronbach’s Alpha, for simple 
reliability, and the Composite Reliability (CR) value to measure composite reliability. 
Reliability indicates whether or not the set of variables is consistent in what it intends to 
measure. Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of the measurement model. For the 
Cronbach’s Alpha value, 0.7 is usually considered the critical threshold. However, 
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academic papers such as Malloy and Agarwall (2010) present values around 0.6. 
Moreover, the validity of the values must take into account the meaning of the items 
and whether they are capturing similar things. In our case, the two items that capture 
efficiency measures (DEA1 and DEA2), the politicisation of the board (CEO and POL) 
and the social responsibility orientation of the board (social expenses in 2009 and the 
profit of 2008 allocated to welfare issues) represent similar concepts. All Composite 
Reliability (CR) values exceeded the critical threshold of 0.7 for all variables.  
  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Third, validity is assessed by using convergent validity and discriminant 
validity. Convergent validity is analysed through average variance extracted (AVE) 
values and evaluates the degree to which the indicators reflect or represent the construct. 
Table 3 shows that all the AVE values are above 0.5, which guarantees convergent 
validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Discriminant validity indicates whether each 
construct in the model is significantly different from the others. The most accepted 
method for PLS is the comparison of the square root of the AVE values and the 
correlation between variables (Barclay et al., 1995). Table 4 presents, on the diagonal, 
the square root of each construct’s AVE values and, off the diagonal, the estimated 
correlations for each pair of constructs. Data in Table 4 confirms the existence of 
discriminant validity between the constructs since the square root of each AVE value is 
higher than the estimated correlations. 
 




5.2 Analysis of the structural model 
The analysis of the structural model enables us to test the proposed relationships. 
To assess the significance of the path coefficients, we used a bootstrapping procedure 
with 5,000 subsamples. This structural model is examined observing the R2 values of 
the dependent variables which present values exceeding the minimum threshold (0.1), 
with the model explaining 11% of the efficiency, 66% of the social responsibility and 
46% of the profitability. To evaluate the predictive relevance of the model, we use the 
Stone-Geisser test, the Q2 values being positive for the three dependent variables (Q2-
Effic = 0.075; Q2-Profit = 0.4139; Q2-Social respons = 0.484). Thus, it can be assumed 
that the dependent variables can be explained by the independent variables. The 
hypotheses can be supported or not through the interpretation of the structural path 
coefficients that are shown in Table 5. 
The results of the structural model in Table 5 indicate that General Assembly 
characteristics did not affect performance. Therefore, we do not find support for 
Hypothesis 1, and our results suggest that this governing body had a representative role 
in SBs. The General Assembly had no significant influence on organisational goals. 
Neither its size, which could generate free-rider and coordination problems, nor its 
politicisation, which could promote a greater social orientation, influence 
organisational goals. This result suggests that the General Assembly had a 
representative role rather than a real influence on managerial decisions, which 
were taken by the boards of directors.  
The politicisation of the board of directors had no significant influence on either 
efficiency or social responsibility (H2 is not supported). The sign of the coefficients 
obtained in the analysis of our structural model, suggests, as expected, that politicians 
had a negative effect on efficiency, but a positive one on social responsibility. 
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Nonetheless, the small values of both coefficients and t statistics (p values) show that 
this relationship was far from being a key factor in organisational performance. It seems 
that politicians were not worried about legitimating their presence or about 
focusing on serving stakeholders’ interests better. 
Board size had a positive influence both on efficiency and on social 
responsibility, but the effect is significant only for social responsibility. Therefore, we 
find support for H3b. The stewardship orientation of the board and the search for 
legitimacy might explain this result, as we discuss in the following section. For H3a, 
the lack of significance of BDsize on efficiency suggests that core financial 
decisions were mainly taken by the professional managers of the boards. 
Stakeholder representatives were most likely focused on the social performance of 
SBs and, thus, more interested in the social dimension and less concerned about 
economic decisions. The legitimation of a larger board may be achieved by 
devoting resources to those issues more important for stakeholders, in this case 
social programs, rather than by taking decisions that affect the efficiency of the 
organisation.  
Results indicate, in line with H4, that efficiency is related to profitability, at the 
10% significant level. This relationship is positive, showing that a profit-oriented 
management resulted in higher profitability. However, the level of significance 
suggests, as argued in the development of this hypothesis, that the transference of 
efficiency to profitability is not direct. Finally, and in accordance with H5, resource 
allocation to social welfare programmes affected financial performance. This 
relationship is positive, that is, a greater allocation to social welfare programmes 
resulted in higher profitability. A greater social orientation of the boards increases 
profitability. This result is in line with Rodgers et al. (2013) and Saeidi et al. (2015), 
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who state that a CSR orientation positively influences financial performance. The 
positive relationship of SR on profitability suggests that the clients of the SBs 
positively valued their social activities and that these strengthened customer 
loyalty towards their local SB. This, in turn, gave the SBs a competitive advantage 
in their main operating area, that is, their commercial activities. Loyalty resulted 
in a greater added value of commercial activities.  
  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
6. Discussion  
The lack of risk control, a basic element of management, led to the transformation 
and dismantling of many of the Spanish SBs, which were an important part of the 
Spanish banking system until the recent financial crisis. Some lessons can be extracted 
from the analysis of these organisations. Regarding corporate governance in non-profit 
entities, where there are no shareholders and ownership is vague, we have analysed the 
influence of the main governing bodies, the General Assembly and the Board of 
Directors, on two key organisational goals, economic and social performance. Neither 
the size of the General Assembly nor its politicisation influenced the goals of these 
entities. This indicates that the General Assembly was not relevant in decision-taking 
processes. Boards of directors were responsible for the operative decisions of the SBs. 
While some authors find that governmental influence on banking entities led to poor 
performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002), our results do not 
suggest that political influence had a significant effect on the efficiency of SBs. The size 
of the board of SBs positively influenced social orientation, that is, the bigger the board, 
the higher the amount allocated to social welfare. This result is consistent with those 
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obtained by Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), De Villiers et al. (2011) and Bachiller et al. 
(2015), who find a positive and significant link between board size and CSR activities. 
A board that is too small may not have the necessary level of competence. Instead, 
larger boards have a positive influence on performance because they possess greater 
collective information. The significant (positive) influence of the size of the board on 
social performance supports the idea that the board acted as a steward of those 
who elected its members and that organisational legitimation was gained through 
social responsibility achievements. Board size did not influence the economic 
performance. This suggests that the main economic decisions were taken by the 
professional managers, which ‘reduced’ the members of the board involved in 
these decisions to a level at which coordination problems and free-rider presence 
did not arise. The level of politicisation of the board is found as a feature that had no 
significant influence on the economic and social performance dimensions of the SBs. 
Politicians most likely felt legitimated by being representatives of democratic 
governments or institutions. 
Efficiency is directly related to profitability. This means that SBs which better 
managed their resources increased their profitability. As Reboredo (2004) and García-
Cestona and Surroca (2008) conclude, the more efficient SBs obtain a better 
performance. The traditional business of the banking sector (granting credit and 
capturing deposits) guaranteed that SBs were profitable. An entity will be more 
profitable when the gap between intermediation margin and costs of its branches is 
bigger. SBs social orientation is positively related to profitability. With a greater social 
orientation, firms may be able to improve their image and reputation and convert them 
to higher firm value and better financial performance. Thus, boards focused on social 
activities can achieve better financial performance. This finding provides insightful 
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knowledge for the Spanish restructured financial sector, for the financial sectors of other 
countries, and for other industries.  
As a limitation of this study, we would like to highlight that this paper has not 
addressed the role of the main governing bodies of SBs in the monitoring and control of 
risks. The lack of risk control has been a major cause of the problems faced by the 
Spanish banking system. Poor corporate governance leads to bank failures and the 
possibility of broader macroeconomic implications (García-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 
2014). 
 
7. Conclusions  
We have investigated, using a structural equation model approach, the relationship 
between the main governing bodies and the economic and social performance of 
Spanish savings banks. We find that General Assembly characteristics did not affect 
SBs performance. The level of politicisation of the board had no significant influence 
on the economic and social performance dimensions of the SBs. Board size did affect 
social performance, but did not influence efficiency, most likely because greater 
stakeholder representativeness made them more oriented to social than to economic 
goals. Greater allocation to social welfare programmes resulted in higher 
profitability. Therefore, boards more focused on social responsibility are able of 
achieving better financial performance.  
Spanish SBs failed because of the lack of risk control but, during many years, SBs 
were a significant part of the financial system and devoted thousands of millions of 
euros to social welfare programmes. Politicisation has been blamed as a source of lack 
of risk control; however, the stewardship orientation of these boards permitted them to 
have competitive advantages that were translated to profitability. Financial institutions 
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Figure 1. Model of the relationships (hypotheses) studied 
 






Table 1 Independent and dependent variables included in the model.  
 Variable Item Definition 
GApolit GApolit Percentage of institutional representatives on the Assembly 
GAsize GAsize Number of members of the Assembly 
BDpolit 
CEO Dummy variable. '1' if CEO political background;  
POL Percentage of institutional representatives on the Board 
BDsize BDsize Number of members of the Board of Directors 
Efficiency 
DEA1 DEA using the intermediation approach 
DEA2 DEA using the production approach 
Social  SR1 Euros devoted to social welfare in 2009 (ln) 
Responsibility SR2 
Allocation of the profits of 2008 approved to social welfare 
(ln) 
Profitability 
ROA1 Profit before Tax/Assets for 2009  
ROA2 Net Profit/Assets for 2009 
Size 
Branches Number of branches (ln) 
Assets Total assets employed (ln) 






Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis (N =45)1  
Item Definition Mean Standard deviation Maximun Minimum 
GApolit (%) 
Percentage of members of the General Assembly 
with a connection in politics 
34.32 10.70 50 16.07 
GAsize 
Total number of members of the General 
Assembly 
131 52.96 320 30 
CEO 
Dummy variable (value 1, CEO with a connection 
in politics; otherwise 0) 
  1 (19/45) 0 (26/45) 
POL (%) 
Percentage of members of the board representing 
regional and local governments 
36.07 19.20 73.68 5.26 
BDsize Total number of members of the board 18 3.68 31 8 
DEA1 
Score obtained from DEA model whose inputs are 
deposits, interest/charges paid and cost of staff 
and whose outputs are credits and interest/fees 
received 
0.93 0.07 1 0.8 
DEA2 
Score obtained from DEA model whose inputs are 
branches and staff and whose outputs are deposits 
and credits 
0.81 0.14 1 0.5 
SR1 Euros devoted to social welfare in 2009 (in 000) 38,943 71,119 444,375 350 
SR2 
Allocation of the profits of 2008 approved to 
social welfare (in €000) 
35,421 77,052 500,000 0 
ROA1 (%) Return on Assets - Profit before Tax/Assets 0.21 0.77 1.13 -3.26 
ROA2 (%) Return on Assets - Profit after Tax/Assets 0.20 0.69 1.08 -3.30 
      
Branches Total number of branches 539 820.43 5,318 21 
Assets Total assets (in €000)) 27,969 46,515 252,759 344,442 
Staff Total number of employees 2,920 4,218.98 25,689 87 
   
 
  
                                                 
1 For some variables, Caja Castilla La Mancha did not disclose financial data and has not been considered 


















GApolit GApolit 1 1 1 1   
GAsize GAsize 1 1 1 1   
BDpolit 
CEO 0.626 
0.633 0.800 0.677 
 POL 0.981 
BDsize BDsize 1 1 1 1  
Effic 
DEA1 0.923 












0.993 0.995 0.986 
  
Assets 0.989   






Table 4. Correlations to determine discriminant validity  
  GApolit GAsize BDpolit BDsize Effic Profit Social Respons.  Size 
GApolit 1        
GAsize 0.146 1       
BDpolit 0.320 0.298 0.823      
BDsize  -0.136 0.701 0.274 1     
Effic 0.055 0.226 0.041 0.312 0.832    
Profit  -0.105  -0.011  -0.044 0.104 0.414 0.993   
Social respons. -0.069 0.465 0.121 0.547 0.366 0.351 0.864 
 Size  -0.069 0.573 0.076 0.528 0.174  -0.058 0.789 0.993 






Table 5. Results of the structural model 
 
Hypotheses   β t-value 
H1 
GApolit -> Effic 0.145 0.789   
GAsize -> Effic -0.308 0.123   
GApolit -> Social respons 0.030 0.388   
GAsize -> Social respons -0.153 1.386   
  
   
  
H2a BDpolit -> Effic -0.100 0.469   
H2b BDpolit -> Social respons 0.026 0.227   
  
   
  
H3a BDsize -> Effic 0.378 1.357   
H3b BDsize -> Social respons 0.261 2.131 ** 
  
   
  
H4 Effic -> PROFIT 0.220 1.995 * 
  
   
  
H5 Social respons -> PROFIT 0.917 3.246 *** 
*p < 0.1 (90% significance) → t(0.1; 40)= 1.684 
**p < 0.05 (95% significance) → t(0.01; 40)= 2.021 
***p < 0.01 (99% significance) → t(0.01; 40)= 2.704 
In bold. Hypotheses accepted.  
The results for the control variable, size, are not presented, but it shows a negative and significant 
influence on profitability and a positive and significant influence on social responsibility. No significant 
influence of size on efficiency is found. 
 
 
